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Law vs. Politics: The Self-Image
of the American Bar (1830-1860)
by MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD *

T

American politics coincided with a vigorous levelling movement in American law. In
one sense the latter crusade was nothing new: hostility toward the
elitism of the legal fraternity had been rife since the days of the
Revolution. But whereas earlier critics had worked to simplify the
content of the law, reformers in the 1830's and 1840's attacked the
problem from a different angle. Eschewing substantive changes,
they sought instead to bring the administrators of the law under
more direct popular control. Their program embraced a wide range
of legislative measures in which worried conservatives read portents
of mob rule.
Mississippi inaugurated one important trend in 1832 by
adopting a constitutional provision which called for the popular
election of all state judges for a term of years. By 1852 fifteen
other states were following her example; of the remaining sixteen
states, ten endorsed the principle of indirect election of judges by
the legislature, while only six adhered to the older system of executive appointment during good behavior. Complementing this
extension of the spoils system to the bench went a curtailment of
judicial power over jury trials. Many states witnessed the enactment of procedural rules which made the judge little more than a
passive moderator in his own court, forbidden to comment on the
evidence or otherwise to assist the jury in reaching a verdict.
Nor did the ordinary lawyer escape the ken of the reformers
in these years. Legislatures redefined professional standards in
many states, scaling down educational requirements for admission
to the bar or eliminating them altogether in such areas as New
Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Indiana. Champions of the common
man likewise found the local bar association as vulnerable a target
as the "monster" Bank of the United States. Both these instituHE ADVENT OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY in
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tions shared the same defects in the eyes of a militant democracy:
they impaired economic competition and they threatened to become
dangerous political pressure groups, isolated from the masses behind a wall of corporate solidarity.
"The tendency of the age is clearly marked," lamented a legal
writer in 1847.
The voice of the multitude is against the legal community.
Leveling begins with the mount of justice. In a sister State,
systems are tottering to their downfall, and innovation and
experiment walk about the ruins. The day is past when the
lawyer can call upon the legislature to assert his rights. The
bar finds no favour at the ballot box. The influence which impresses the stranger, arises from individual energy and not
from association. A cry is going out over the land. Radicalism is infectious as the pestilence. The tide of popular will
must soon sweep away our prerogative, unless we stay its
waters.'
Aside from the admission that lawyers had a prerogative
worth defending, this was a standard complaint which later historians have tended to accept at face value. It enables them to fit
the second third of the nineteenth century neatly into a dramatic
triptych illustrating "The Lawyer's Progress." On one side appears
the Golden Age of revolutionary jurisprudence; on the other, the
dawn of modern professionalism with the formation of the American Bar Association (1878) and similar agencies. In between
sprawls a scene of darkness and confusion-the lower depths of the
American bar, whose earlier attainments and esprit de corps are
alike submerged beneath a wave of barbarian invasions. "Demoralization" and "deprofessionalization" are the terms most often
used to describe the condition of the lawyer in the 1840's and
1850's.2
Appealing to the imagination through its vivid contrasts, this
interpretation satisfies the demands of common sense as well. It
even adds another link to the chain of causation leading to the Civil
War, insofar as popular contempt for legal authority may have contributed to the ultimate recourse to armed violence. But for all its
1 "New Publications: R~gles sur la Profession d'Avocat, parMallot,"
7 Penn. L. J.99 (1847).
2 Standard surveys include: Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times (St. Paul, 1953), 232 ff.; and Blackard, "The
Demoralization of the Legal Profession in Nineteenth Century America,"
16 Tenn. L. Rev. 314 (1940).
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plausibility, it rests upon a very shaky foundation. The closing
with eclat of several small bar associations; the jeremiads of conservative academics such as James Kent and Joseph Story; the
presumed incompetence of elected judges and self-taught lawyersthese are the meager sources from which elaborate, and often unwarranted, inferences have been drawn.
Wherever one turns, the details of the picture cry out for reappraisal. Did the caliber of state judges deteriorate as a result of
popular election? Basic to such an inquiry should be a clear understanding of the nature and rate of turnover among judicial personnel both before and after the elective system went into effect.
The materials for a thorough study are abundant, but to date no
scholar has undertaken the task, even at the superior court level.
Yet the results might well prove shattering to conventional assumptions regarding the vagaries of mass political behavior. To
cite only one example: Isaac F. Redfield, chief justice of the Vermont Supreme Court and a distinguished jurist, was re-elected to
his post annually for twenty-five years, from 1835 to his retirement in 1860, although he was a rather stiff-necked character who
opposed the, dominant political forces of his state. Except for his
unusually long period of service, his case typified a general trend in
Vermont, where judges were regularly returned to office from year
to year during good behavior.
Was the Vermont pattern repeated in other states? Did the
elective principle offer greater security of tenure to frontier judges
than to their counterparts in more sophisticated urban environments? These questions still await serious investigation, as does the
role of bar associations in the middle years of the nineteenth century.
The statistical incidence of these associations has never been
computed. To do so would involve an exhaustive search through
local newspapers, since state and national organizations did not
exist. But a careful study of even one key area, such as Massachusetts, would do much to test the validity of the accepted hypothesis
that institutional ties crumbled before an aroused public opinion.3
Meanwhile some new perspectives on the alleged demoralization of the bar may be gleaned from a study of legal periodicals.
These publications have been strangely neglected by historians,
3 Anton-Hermann Chroust has verified the existence of some seventeen bar associations in various states during, the post-i830 period, but
his fragmentary researches leave many important questions unanswered
and serve chiefly as a useful introduction to the problem. See Chroust,
The Rise of the Legal Profession in America (2 vols., Norman, 1965),
II, 129-154.
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although in volume alone they form a striking feature of the post1830 years, as the following chart attests:
Date
Pre-1830
1830-1839
1840-1849
1850-1859
1860-1869

New Law
Magazines
12
5
13
19
154

To be sure, these figures are somewhat misleading, since most
fledgling journals failed to survive more than a few years A tabulation of all law magazines in existence at the beginning of each
decade reveals a more conservative picture:
Date
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870

Law Magazines
1
1
5
2
10
9
17

Nor should it be forgotten that magazine publishing generally
experienced a boom during these years, due to low postage rates,
typographical innovations, and improved transportation and distribution facilities.
Yet with due allowance for these caveats, the rate of growth
for such specialized publications remains impressive, and suggests
that the legal journal may have filled a peculiar need among American lawyers sensitive to popular distrust of more formal professional agencies.
The changing format of the law magazine itself supports this
impression. Whereas earlier journals (of which Hall's American
Law Journal (1808-1817) was both pioneer and prototype) tended
to be speculative and treated many subjects of general interest to
the educated community, the typical magazine of the post-1830
years conceived its function in rigorously utilitarian terms. De4 This statistical table, and the one below, have been compiled from
lists found in Frederick C. Hicks, Materials and Methods of Legal Research (2d ed., Rochester, 1933), 147-148, supplemented by material from
Leonard A. Jones, ed., An Index to Legal PeriodicalLiterature (Boston,
1888).
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signed to serve the "workingmen of the profession," such journals
as the Monthly Law Reporter (1838-1866), New York Legal Observer (1842-1854), Pennsylvania Law Journal (1842-1848), and
Western Law Journal (1843-1853) disdained theorizing and offered
their readers a "medium of communication concerning legal matters of fact useful and interesting to gentlemen of the bar."5 A
major portion of every issue was devoted to a reporting of recent
court decisions, in advance of their appearance in official volumes
of reports. Reviews of new law books, hints for the improvement
of office habits or courtroom techniques, summaries of new state
laws, and memoirs of practitioners living and dead completed the
contents. Behind these diverse features and pervading them all lay
a further objective which was seldom openly avowed: to create for
lawyers an effective counterimage to the popular stereotype of the
crafty despoiler of the poor.6
In this quest for a usable symbolism the obituary notice
played a conspicuous part. Perhaps, as Herbert Butterfield has suggested in regard to seventeenth-century science, 7 every great movement sooner or later enters a myth-making phase, in which earlier
achievements and personalities are reappraised and idealized as
guides for the future. The traits of the departed pioneer then become an imaginary yardstick by which to measure the progress of
his successors.
American law was clearly ripe for such a retrospective critique
by 1830. A juristic revolution had long been completed; new institutions and techniques were in successful operation; and the old
actors were fast passing from the stage. For beleaguered law
writers necrology held both the seeds of corporate identity and a
possible answer to the egalitarian challenge.
A few simple themes recur from obituary to obituary, from
journal to journal. The American lawyer was invariably a man of
indomitable industry and perseverance. Lamenting the early death
of a promising young Massachusetts attorney, his biographer
struck a familiar chord when he informed his readers:
He was a born lawyer. His mind had a native affinity for the
study of legal rules and principles . . . His taste for the law
was natural and instinctive, and the study of it was a labor of
5 "Miscellany," 1 Monthly L. Rep. 55 (1838).
6 The generalizations which follow are based upon a survey of sixteen law magazines, selected with a view to geographical distribution
and representing the least as well as the most successful publications.
7 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science: 1300-1800
(rev. ed., N.Y., 1958), 161-174.
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love. He would have been a good lawyer with very little study,
for the legal character of his mind would have supplied the
deficiencies of book knowledge, and led him by a sort of "rusticum judicium" to the same results to which others had arrived
by the laborious processes of study. . . . Many men would
have been contented with this original turn for the law, this
legal mother-wit, and have preferred to solve the questions
which came before them by a sort of Zerah Colburn process,
rather than avail themselves of the borrowed aid of the learning of others. But his ambition was of a nobler and higher
kind, and he studied the law as zealously and conscientiously
as if his books had been his only guides and dependence. He
had that invaluable property in a lawyer-one not often found
in combination with a mind so rapid in its movements and
powerful in its grasp as his-unwearied patience in legal in8
vestigation.
The need for constant application scarcely diminished as one
moved upward in the profession. The example of Reuben Saffold
(1788-1847), chief justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama, could
serve as a text for many another early jurist: "Endowed by nature
with sound judgment and an accurate and discriminating mind, he
never feared that laborious attention which enabled him to master
the subjects he was to decide." 9
A stress on the laborious pursuit of legal knowledge acquitted
the lawyer of quackery but opened the door to a paradox. For if the
path to success was indeed so arduous, how could the average man
hope to achieve it? And was this not the chief complaint against
the bar of the 1830's-that its members formed an exclusive clique
sustained by esoteric rules which the masses could not understand?
To reconcile the technicalities of the law with the demands of an
open society required no little skill; but the publicists of the day
measured up to the challenge.
They were careful to dissociate the practice of their craft from
mere dilettantism or an undue reliance on book learning. Since law
was a rational science, they argued, its basic principles could be
easily grasped by all men. Uncertainties arose only when one sought
to apply these principles to varying fact situations. Success in this
context depended upon common sense and a firsthand knowledge of
everyday life, two qualities in which most early lawyers had excelled.
8"Hillard, "Biographical Sketch of James C. Alvord," 2 Am. Jurist
and L. Mag. 377-378 (1840).
9 "Obituary Notices," 10 Monthly L. Rep. 383 (1847).
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Plain-spoken Oliver Ellsworth, Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court (1796-1800), demonstrated the "active virtue" of an entire generation of legal types who solved their problems with rule-of-thumb practicality: "He satisfied or subdued the
reason, with little endeavour either to excite the feelings or to gratify the fancy."'1 And a grass-roots realism characterized the
successful practitioner of later days as well. When the brilliant
Massachusetts jurist Lemuel Shaw died in 1861, his eulogists found
that his most advantageous trait had been "good, sound, AngloSaxon common sense:"
This it was which gave him such mastery over the rules and
principles of the common law, that "ample and boundless jurisprudence" which the experience and common sense of successive generations of men have gradually built up, and which
came to us from our English ancestors, a precious inheritance
of freedom and of the great principles of justice and right."
As a paragon of industry, fortitude, and shrewdness, the
American lawyer shared several of the attributes ascribed to the
"self-made man" by contemporary writers of success manuals and
didactic novels. Nor does the analogy end here. Both ideals embodied the "work and win" formula of the Protestant ethic, according to which rewards invariably followed well directed effort.
"I have often thought that if other men could have been as diligent and assiduous as Mr. Webster, they might have equalled him
in achievement," declared a member of the New York Bar in a
characteristic vein. 12 Success for the lawyer, as for the self-made
man, did not necessarily imply large financial returns, however; the
true measure of accomplishement lay in the moral satisfaction
afforded by a life well spent in the service of others.
Striking in their parallelism, the two mythologies diverged in
equally important ways that point up the limits within which law
writers had to operate. As John G. Cawelti has shown, the self-help
advocates of the antebellum period spoke for a status-oriented,
preindustrial America that no longer existed in fact. Fearful of
violent social change, they continued to preach the gospel of improvement within one's God-given calling; hostile to big business
10 "Biographical Sketch of Chief Justice Ellsworth," 8 Am. L. Mag.
271 (1844).
11 "The Death of Chief Justice Shaw," 24 Monthly L. Rep. 10 (1861).
12 "Proceedings of the Bar upon the Occasion of the Death of Daniel
Webster," 15 Monthly L. Rep. 585 (1853).
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and immigrant labor, they reaffirmed the standards of the independent craftsman as a guide to success in the age of the corporation.
Self-made men, by definition, were conservative Christians who
aspired only to a modest respectability that posed no threat to
established power structures.1 3
This formula did not meet the needs of law writers. Since the
bar was already under attack for its alleged exclusiveness, any
talk of stabilizing vocational lines would mean a gain for the enemy. Instead, publicists sought to show that the law had always been
a wide-open field, inviting ambitious men from other walks of life
to abandon their previous pursuits in order to join the ranks of
its leaders. This was a far cry from the static society envisaged by
the self-help school; in its fully developed form it amounted to an
endorsement of continuing social upheaval within the profession:
It is as hard for a rich man's son to obtain the honors of the
bar, as it is for the rich man himself to enter the kingdom of
heaven. They come from the farm and the workshop, from that
condition of life to which the great majority belong. They are
counted by the multitude as one of themselves, and they hail
their elevation as a triumph of their own over all that looked
like aristocracy. With enthusiastic pride they push them on
from honor to honor, until a new generation arises that knew
not their origin and see them only in their exaltation. They see
them lifted above the common level; their jealousy is awakened; the order of aristocracy is scented in the atmosphere
that surrounds them, and they receive no cordial support except for those august stations to which only advanced age and
extensive renown can aspire. A new set is brought up from the
same origin to run the same career. And thus it happens that
the children of the cabins come up and occupy the palaces of
14
the Republic.
This mobility received specific documentation in the obituary
columns. A random sampling of forty-eight death notices carried
in the Monthly Law Reporter (which made a point of listing obscure practitioners as well as celebrities) reveals the following
family backgrounds:
'8John G. Cawelti, Apostles of the Self-made Man (Chicago, 1965),
39-75.
14 "Inaugural Address of Hon. A. Caruthers, Professor of Law in

Cumberland University, Lebanon, Tennessee," 3 U.S. Monthly L. Mag.
542 (1851).
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Doctor
- 3
Merchant - 5

Minister -11
Farmer -10
Mechanic- 2
Soldier

- 2

Lawyer

-11

Judge

- 4
48

Several foreign-born lawyers figure in the list, as a further indication of the varied sources of legal recruitment. While spokesmen
for the self-made man might draw invidious comparisons between
the mores of the immigrant and the old-stock native, law writers
could not ignore the contributions to their science made by men of
the stamp of Peter S. Du Ponceau of France, Thomas Addis Emmet
of Ireland, and Francis Lieber of Germany.
Similarly, lawyers were more realistic in acknowledging pecuniary motives as a major factor in their choice of a career. If
they insisted that the average practitioner "lived well and died
poor," this was hardly a counsel of Christian moderation. A surplus. of riches enhanced one's legal reputation. "It is understood,
that he was as eminently successful in the accumulation of wealth,
as in the prosecution of his professional pursuits," observed the
biographer of one minor figure, with obvious satisfaction. 15
Having entered the law to improve their economic status,
young men could not be expected to conform to the strict vocational
limitations imposed by the self-help manuals. Law was accordingly
defined as a primary, but not exclusive, pursuit. Since an attorney's
practice so often revolved about business questions, a personal involvement in the world of affairs could prove beneficial both to his
pocketbook and to his standing at the bar. He might safely engage
in real estate ventures, railroad promotion, or banking, so long as
he continued to give his paramount allegiance to the law. For there
was no way to move up from the legal profession, which alone
offered a satisfying blend of material reward, intellectual challenge,
and social utility. Attorneys who abandoned their practice to pursue other callings were like apostates from a true faith; and none
deserved greater censure for their acts of heresy than lawyer-politicians.
The divorce of law from politics was the most significant contribution which publicists of the Jacksonian era made to legal
15 "Obituary Notices: Lewis Bigelow," 1 Monthly L. Rep. 275 (1839).
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mythology. Hitherto political service had always been regarded as
a legitimate by-product of legal competence. Few of the practitioners whose deaths were recorded in the law journals of the
1840's had missed election to a state or national legislature at
some point in their careers. Collectively they established a pattern
of public leadership which had answered well the needs of the early
Republic. Biographers described their conduct in office as "fearless," "manly," and "independent," and paid tribute to their statesmanlike vision and grasp of sound principles.
Yet their example, however useful in the days of Washington,
Adams, and the Virginia Dynasty, had little relevance for a more
democratic age. Latter-day lawyers were informed that they might
learn more valuable lessons from studying the unworthy politicians
of the past, such as the Maine legislator John Holmes, who
"trimmed his sails to the prevailing wind of popular favor" during
the first administration of James Madison:
"The gladsome light of jurisprudence" was not bright and
warm enough for him;-he loved law, but he loved politics
more. . . . In reviewing the life of such a man, we may perhaps derive a useful reflection upon the danger, not to say folly,
of leaving the broad highway of an honorable and profitable
profession, for the fitful and the exciting pursuits, and the
unsubstantial rewards of the mere politician. That Mr. Holmes
had as much of popular favor and its fruits, as falls to the
lot of men, none will deny; that they furnished him the satisfaction and the rewards which he would have acquired in the
quiet progress of his profession, we do not believe. 16
Though Holmes's political opportunism was exceptional for
its time, according to law writers, since 1830 the exception had become the rule. "It is well known," declared one commentator in reference to the latter period, "that men of the highest eminence in
our profession are seldom members of legislative assemblies in
this country, and, when they are, their influence is comparatively
small."'1 7 Political posts now went to party men-third or fourthrate lawyers who acknowledged no higher principle than self-interest. To retain the support of a mass electorate, these legal turncoats placed themselves at the head of every popular movement,
however unwise or dangerous its objectives. They even spearheaded
legislative attacks upon the bar and the judiciary, and encouraged
a rash of other ill-considered measures which purportedly reflected
an ever changing popular will. Under such circumstances politics
1

"The Hon. John Holmes," 6 Monthly L. Rep. 151, 154 (1843).

17 "Codification," 7 Monthly L. Rep. 350 (1844).
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no longer provided an attractive avocation for the responsible
lawyer, who was advised by publicists to stick to his practice if he
valued his self-respect.
Behind this warning lay no lament for the passing of the classconscious "gentleman" in politics. Law writers of the 1830's denied
that such a haughty personage had ever existed, at least among
lawyers, who had always been simple, hardworking, democratic
types. It was not pride or fastidiousness which kept the best attorneys out of politics in the Jacksonian era, but the fact that politics
had developed into a full-fledged profession with specialized rules
of its own-several of which ran counter to deeply cherished legal
attitudes and practices.
Representation, for example, no longer meant what it once did.
When biographers praised the manly independence of an early legislator, they were reading political history through legal spectacles.
A good politician, by their criteria, represented his constituents
as an attorney represented his clients. That is, he acted to promote
their best interests as he understood them; and in case of disagreement, his judgment ultimately prevailed. This view of political responsibility could not be reconciled with the more democratic notion that a representative was bound in all cases to carry out the
wishes of his constituents. While few successful law-makers ever
disregarded the majority will in practice, law writers continued to
promote the theory of legal representation until the perfecting of
party organization and party discipline in the 1830's demonstrated
its obsolescence for all purposes save that of myth.
A similar conflict between legal attitudes and political realities
occurred in connection with the problem of electioneering. Lawyers
were trained to believe that the job must seek the man. A mass of
literature stretching back to the Middle Ages condemned the improper solicitation of legal business and required that the lawyer
wait patiently in his office for clients to appear (which they were
certain to do, by a process of legal legerdemain, if the would-be
practitioner had worked sufficiently hard to prepare himself for
the duties of the profession). Publicists incorporated this trait into their image of the early American lawyer, who allegedly looked
upon public office as a temporary employment, to be secured like any
other retainer. Typical were the circumstances surrounding the
election of Charles Marsh, a Vermont attorney, to the House of
Representatives in 1814: "He was always averse to holding elective
offices, and in this instance, was forced into Congress against his
will."' 8
Is

"Obituary Notice," 11 Monthly L. Rep. 527 (1849).
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Twenty years later the reluctant candidate stood little chance
of winning an election, even in fiction. Political campaigning had
become an art in itself, demanding catchy slogans, colorful personalities, and a degree of ballyhoo foreign to the thinking of
earlier generations. No lawyer could now be a successful politician,
writers cautioned, unless he abandoned his professional integrity
and became a hireling of the masses. Perhaps the insistent appeal
to the tradition of the independent practitioner betrayed some uneasiness over current values within the profession itself, where
many an attorney had already shown an unseemly willingness to
exchange his independence for a secure job with a law firm or corporation.
From a tactical standpoint, of course, the separation of the
"real" lawyer from politics offered several advantages to propagandists. It enabled them to class as unprincipled demagogues all members of the bar who spoke up for legislative reform of the law; it
suggested that most statutes were either unwise or unnecessary
additions to an existing body of basic principles; and it reaffirmed
the image of the lawyer as a hardworking technician whose services
were as necessary to society as those of any other skilled craftsman:
To the mass of practitioners, the law is not, except on some rare
occasions, an intellectual pursuit. Truth compels us to own, with
Wordsworth, that "the demands of life and action," with us,
as with men of other pursuits, "but rarely correspond to the dignity and intensity of human desires." We are clever men of business, as a mass, and no more. It is our BUSINESS TALENTS,
our PROMPTNESS, ACCURACY, and DILIGENCE, that cornmands success, respect and influence. 19
Much the same utilitarian and antipolitical line was taken by
apologists for another unpopular occupational group-the officer
corps of the United States Army and Navy--during these years,
and for similar reasons. Military journalists argued that a permanent cadre of trained professionals posed no threat to democratic
institutions, because their energies were wholly absorbed by the
technical demands of their science, which gave them neither the
20
time nor the inclination for political intrigues.
19 "Office Duties," 4 Am. L. Reg. 193 (1856).
See, for example: Sydney, "Thoughts on the Organization of the
Army," The Military and Naval Magazine of the United States, II (December, 1833), 193-198; and "The Wants of the Navy," Army and Navy
Chronicle, XI (December 17, 1840), 398-399. William B. Skelton of Ohio
State University, who brought this analogy to my attention, is planning
a major study of the military mind in nineteenth century America.
20
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The defense of professional groups in terms of their practical
usefulness to society deserves special emphasis, since Perry Miller,
in a recent important study of the legal mind in nineteenth-century
America, has suggested that the antebellum lawyers were trying to
establish themselves as an intellectual elite in the eyes of the public. 21 While this may have been the objective of certain academic
jurists such as Kent, Story, and David Hoffman, a different view
prevailed among the rank and file who patronized the law magazines. For them legal practice was a bread-and-butter concern, a
daily business in which intellectual refinements found little place.
"The most learned lawyer in the world would not get business, if
he did not attend to it," warned Timothy Walker to the graduating
class of the Cincinnati Law School in 1839. "The question with the
client is, not who knows the most law, but who will manage a cause
the best; and, all other things being equal, he will manage a cause
' 22
the best, who devotes most attention to it."
Practitioners could not afford to waste time on frivolous cultural pursuits, when it took constant effort just to keep abreast of
the increasing volume of new court decisions. If they turned to
polite literature for occasional relaxation, they were likely to choose
an established classic whose familiarity with the public could be
put to good use in courtroom debate. The Bible and Shakespeare
were particular favorites for, as one commentator explained, quite
apart from their aesthetic qualities, "they may also, sometimes, be
quoted to great advantage; the former never but with reverence;
the latter, never pedantically. ' 23 At a time when legal reputations
still owed much to oratorical skills, an acquaintance with "good"
literature could further aid an attorney to develop a graceful speaking style. On the death of Rufus Choate (1799-1859), perhaps the
most cultivated orator of his time, an attempt was made to place
the whole matter of nonlegal learning in proper perspective: "True,
he laid his foundations deep and broad, by no means confined to
legal acquirements, but embracing a rich classic culture, and what
we believe aided him more than all, the devoted reading of the Bible:
yet these other studies were only episodes, or rather recreations,
' 24
renewing his professional energies.
21 Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (New York, 1965), 99-265.
22 "Ways and Means of Professional Success; being the substance
of a Valedictory Address to the Graduates of the Law Class, in the Cincinnati College, by T. Walker, Professor of Law in that Institution:
delivered March 2, 1839," 1 Western L. J. 545 (1844).
23 "A Letter of Judge Daggett," 8 Monthly L. Rep. 94 (1845).
24 Fuller, "Rufus Choate," 25 Monthly L. Rep. 266-267 (1863).
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To picture the lawyer as detached from all interests which did
not relate to his professional life suited the needs of myth-makers;
but they found it difficult to reconcile their antipolitical attitudes
with the demands of public order. For if legislatures were corrupt
and the laws they passed unwise, why should citizens obey? A
mounting wave of lawlessness throughout the Union made the question far from academic, as journalists pointed with concern to
lynchings in Mississippi, riots in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts,
duels in Louisiana, and vigilante justice in the goldfields of California. Nor were these symptoms of social disintegration confined
to the local level; even Federal authorities met with popular resistance in their efforts to enforce fugitive slave laws. Some antislavery agitators openly professed adherence to a "higher law" than
that found in the Constitution of the United States, making the
individual conscience the determining guide to political, as well as
religious, behavior. Such subjectivity impressed legal writers as
the ultimate democratic heresy, and they denounced the use of
moralistic arguments to justify the overthrow of existing institutions:
It is among the strange signs of the times, that individuals are
found saying and doing the most violent, unjust and dangerous
things, without rebuke, because they say and do them in the
cause of anti-slavery. Scarcely a voice is raised against these
excesses, because, if raised, it would be answered with the
charge of enmity to the slave. This should not be. . . . If we
equally resist
would resist the extension of slavery, we must
25
the spirit of rebellion against the constitution.
But counsels of moderation and proposals to strengthen the
police forces in major urban centers provided no adequate solution
to the problem of bad laws. Acknowledging that the public had
reason to distrust its legislators, spokesmen for the "workingmen
of the profession" sought a technique by which the bar might assume responsibility for a reform program without becoming embroiled in partisan politics. Their strategy called for the creation
of a new institution which did not take practical shape until the
next generation: the independent administrative commission.
In its most rudimentary form, the commission idea suggested
a small permanent body of trained specialists appointed by the
governor of a state to scrutinize the final draft of all legislative
measures. They would act primarily as stylistic critics, correcting
the language of a law to make it more intelligible to the general
25

(1843).
"The Latimer Case," 5 Monthly L. Rep. 497
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public as well as consistent with professional norms. Some writers
went further and argued for a true board of censors, with power
to weed out in advance all doubtful bills, including any which contradicted previous enactments. Through their expert guidance a
haphazard mass of state legislation might in time be reduced to an
orderly system of harmonious rules.
But it was as a potential planning agency that the commission
made its strongest appeal to the legal imagination. Publicists
dreamed of interstate boards of lawyers and jurists entrusted with
the duty of framing national laws to cover such matters as commerce, land tenures, education, and crimes. Unlike "tinkering legislatures," these professional bodies would engage in comprehensive social planning, working from basic principles to their most
far-reaching ramifications:
. . . and this process seems to be most in harmony with the
spirit of the time, which is inquiring, philosophical and theorizing. . . What would be said of the architect, who, to
build his arch, should try, one after another, all possible shapes,
till at last he hit the one which would stand, when he had a
slate, and in his head principles, on which he could in a little
while reckon just what must be built to form a true and perfect

structure

?26

For the first time since the early Republic the interests of the
technician could also be reconciled with those of the statesman,
as lawyers proposed to bury sectional differences within a network
of uniform economic and cultural regulations coextensive with the
Union.
Their visions remained unfulfilled, however, for reasons which
should have been apparent to every realistic member of the bar.
Apart from their elitist pretensions, all of these schemes depended
in greater or less degree upon the support of those very legislative bodies whose alleged irresponsibility had created the nation's
lawless temper. Furthermore, the commission idea, for all its
apolitical tone, pointed to the development of a fourth branch of
the government-an administrative wing whose personnel would
enjoy the substance of political power without its attendant risks.
26 "Advancement of the Law by Lawyers," 11 Monthly L. Rep. 150151 (1848). For the details of several projects, see: Tellkampf, "On
Codification, or the Systematizing of the Law," 8 Am. Jurist and L. Mag.
283 (1842); "National Jurisprudence," 3 U.S. Monthly L. Mag. 125
(1851) ; "Legislation," 5 U.S. Monthly L. Mag. 125 (1852) ; Bishop, "Law
in the United States," 3 Am. L. Reg. 60 (1854).
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And it would take a Civil War to demonstrate the merits of bureaucratic planning to a public still wedded to theories of laissez faire.
Meanwhile the idealism of the antebellum bar found a practical outlet closer to home. In 1849 the American Legal Association
was established
for the purpose of insuring safety and facility in the collection
of claims and the transaction of legal business throughout the
United States. Its design is to furnish professional and business men with the name of at least one prompt, efficient and
trustworthy Lawyer in every shire-town and, in each of the
principal cities and villages in the Union, who will transact
with despatch and for a reasonable compensation, such pro27
fessional business as may be entrusted to him.
Promoted largely through the efforts of John Livingston, a law
writer and editor, the Association was both broader and narrower
than any previous legal organization in the nation's history. While
it claimed members in every state of the Union (as well as two in
England), its objectives were rigorously limited. As a lawyer referral service, it disclaimed all interest in politics, community welfare, or even the encouragement of a general spirit of fraternalism
among practitioners. Instead, it appealed to the technician's desire
for more rational procedures, as it focused attention upon the
lawyer as a competitive businessman.
Every practicing attorney who subscribed five dollars and furnished "satisfactory evidence of professional integrity and capacity" could join the A.L.A. on a two-year basis. He thereupon
received an. official Manual, complete with constitution, by-laws,
and a list of the names and addresses of all members (including
one director in each state). The Association undertook to distribute
additional copies of the Manual to the "business public," and also
to place advertisements from time to time in major newspapers
across the country. The advantages of such a centralized reference
bureau were sufficiently alluring to keep the A.L.A. in existence for
some five years, after which it quietly expired.
As a stimulus to professional unity, the Association served a
useful purpose; but even more important was the work of its Secretary, John Livingston. Drawing upon a voluminous legal correspondence, Livingston compiled in 1850 an authoritative list of
the names and addresses of all practicing lawyers and judges in the
United States. His United States Lawyer's Directory and Offcial
27 "The American Legal Association," 3 U.S. Monthly L. May. Advertiser (1851).
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Bulletin incorporated data supplied by state and local officials down
to the level of county sheriffs, and formed the first accurate legal
census ever taken in America. Its publication testified both to the
coming-of-age of the American bar and to its growing preoccupation with intramural matters. Livingston revised his register
annually until the collapse of the A.L.A. in 1854; thereafter he
continued to bring out new editions at irregular intervals through
1868.28

The approach of civil war did little to change the introspective
bias of most legal writers. Characteristically they tended to view
the slavery crisis as a contrivance of partisan politicians, useful in
campaign years but of no real concern to the general public. As late
as October, 1860, one commentator predicted that if "these contending dogmas be pressed to the practical result of deranging
trade, augmenting prices, and curtailing commerce, a spirit will
be roused which will put an end to all further disturbance from this
29
source."
One may deprecate these attitudes of olympian detachment as
a cowardly flight from responsibility, but they may likewise have
represented an inevitable stage in the professionalization of the
American lawyer. This much at least is certain: in the developing
pattern of nineteenth-century legal thought they played no inconsiderable role. Emory Washburn illustrated the ease with which
they were transmitted to the postwar generation when he told a
graduating class at Harvard Law School in July, 1864, of the destiny that awaited the legal expert in the reconstruction era to

come:
You have only to wait a brief time, when the business of reorganization must be resumed; and the people will look to the
aid and counsel of others than the mad or selfish politicians,
whose evil counsels or rash judgments first involved them in
the disastrous consequences of alienated affections and civil
discord. Such a violence has been done to our institutions, such
a strain has been made upon the strength of the common bond
that bound us together as a nation, that it will require the
wisest counsel, the calmest judgment, and the most devoted
patriotism to restore the government again to anything like
28 The Library of Congress records list ten separate publications
between 1850 and 1868. As editor of the United States Monthly Law Magazine, Livingston also devoted one composite issue (Oct.-Dec., 1851) to
a reprinting of his complete Law Register for that year.
29 "Slavery in the States and Territories," 23 Monthly L. Rep. 458
(1860).
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harmonious action. And these, I repeat, are not to be found in
the political leaders who caused the mischief to begin with.
Nor is it to the mere man of business that we are to look, nor
to the scholar, or man of letters, however speculative he may
have shown himself in his study into causes which be hid beyond the reach of his unpractised vision. In the restoration of
peace to our distracted country under the dominion of well
administered law, such as she had enjoyed for three quarters
of a century, I am sure that our profession are to take a most
important part.30
Indeed, in the postwar world of regulatory commissions, scientific planning, and patrician politics, the elitist ideals of the antebellum bar became practical realities for the first time. But the
growth of administrative agencies, far from settling the conflict
between political and legal values, merely added a new dimension to
the American lawyer's continuing quest for acceptance in a democratic society.

30 Washburn, "Reconstruction: The Duty of the Profession to the
Times," 26 Monthly L. Rep. 278 (1864).

